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Are	  Adaptations	  Necessarily	  Genetic?	  	  Steven	  J.	  Scher	  
	  Buss,	  Haselton,	  Shackelford,	  Bleske,	  and	  Wakefield	  (1998)	  are	  to	  be	  commended	  for	  clarifying	   concepts	   from	   evolutionary	   science	   and	   detailing	   the	   utility	   of	   these	  concepts	   for	   psychology.	   Rather	   than	   contribute	   to	   the	   emotion-­‐laden	   arguments	  that	  have	  accompanied	  much	  of	  the	  development	  of	  evolutionary	  psychology,	  Buss	  et	  al.’s	  contribution	  helps	  psychologists	  apply	  ideas	  from	  evolutionary	  biology	  to	  the	  study	  of	  mind	  and	  behavior.	  	  However,	  Buss	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  erred	  when	  they	  wrote	  that	  “there	  must	  be	  genes	  for	  an	  adaptation	  because	  such	  genes	  are	  required	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  adaptation	  from	  parents	   to	   offspring”	   (p.	   535).	   It	   is	   incorrect	   to	   say	   that	   genes	   are	   the	   only	   way	  behavioral	   or	   psychological	   features	   can	   be	   passed	   from	   parents	   to	   children.	  Decades	   of	   research	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   children	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   the	   same	  religion,	  political	  affiliation,	  and	  socioeconomic	  status	  as	  their	  parents.	  Surely	  Buss	  et	  al.	  don’t	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  genes	  for	  these	  characteristics.	  Nonetheless,	  these	  features	  have	  passed	  from	  parents	  to	  offspring.	  	  Buss	   and	   his	   colleagues	   might	   argue	   that	   the	   examples	   given	   above	   are	   not	  adaptations	  because	  they	  don’t	  solve	  an	  adaptive	  problem	  or	  don’t	  have	  the	  design	  features	  that	  characterize	  adaptations.	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  these	  features	  that	  precludes	  them	  from	  being	  adaptations,	  unless	  one	  simply	  defines	  an	  adaptation	  as	  being	  passed	  down	  by	  genes.	  There	   is	  no	  a	  priori	   reason	  why	   these	  features	  are	  any	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  adaptations	  than,	  for	  example,	  the	  tendency	  to	  be	  a	  short-­‐term	   or	   long-­‐term	   strategist	   in	  mating	   (	   Buss	   &	   Schmitt,	   1993)	   or	   to	   solve	  problems	  of	  social	  deception	  (	  Cosmides,	  1989).	  	  Buss	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   defined	   an	   adaptation	   as	   an	   “inherited	   and	   reliably	   developing	  characteristic	   that	   came	   into	   existence	   as	   a	   feature	   of	   a	   species	   through	   natural	  selection	   because	   it	   helped	   to	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   facilitate	   reproduction	   during	  the	   period	   of	   its	   evolution”	   (p.	   535).	   However,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   a	   feature	  facilitates	   reproduction—its	   inclusive	   fitness—”is	   not	   a	   property	   of	   an	   individual	  organism	  but	  rather	  a	  property	  of	  its	  actions	  or	  effects”	  (	  Buss	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  p.	  534).	  The	   effects	   of	   a	  phenotype	  determine	  whether	   those	   effects	  will	   be	   selected.	  How	  those	  phenotypic	  effects	  arise	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  selection	  process.	  	  Phenotypic	  psychological	  mechanisms	  surely	  arise	   through	  a	   complicated	  process.	  The	  role	  of	  genes	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  rather	  far	  away	  and	  indirect.	  Certainly,	  our	  current	  understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   mind	   and	   body	   limits	   our	   ability	   to	  understand	   how	   genes—which	   code	   for	   physical	   structure—contribute	   to	  psychological	  development.	  Although	  the	  physical	  body	  can	  be	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  (e.g.,	  mass,	  volume,	  velocity),	  these	  parameters	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  mental	  world	  (	  Williams,	  1985).	  Until	  parameters	  that	  apply	  in	  
both	  domains	   can	  be	   identified,	   it	  will	   be	  difficult	   to	  understand	  how	  genes	  affect	  behavior.	  	  In	   the	   meantime,	   it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   to	   imagine	   adaptations	   that	   are	   “reliably	  developing	  characteristic[s]”	  (	  Buss	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  p.	  535),	  not	  because	  specific	  genes	  have	  been	  developed	  for	  their	  assembly,	  but	  because	  a	  cultural	  transmission	  system	  has	  selected	  cultural	  products	  that	  facilitate	  reproduction.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  human	  mate	   selection.	   Buss	   (e.g.,	   1989)	   has	   convincingly	   demonstrated	   a	   set	   of	   sex	  differences	   that	   appear	   in	  many	   cultures.	   However,	   nothing	   in	   the	   data	   Buss	   has	  collected	  (or	  in	  the	  hypotheses	  he	  has	  generated)	  relates	  to	  a	  genetic	  basis	  for	  these	  differences.	   If	   the	   tendency	   of	   men	   to	   put	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   physical	  attractiveness,	   for	   example,	   solved	   an	   adaptive	   problem	   for	   men,	   and	   if	   the	  emphasis	  on	  physical	  attractiveness	  by	  men	  could	  be	  acquired	   from	  one’s	  parents	  through	  some	  form	  of	  social	  learning	  (a	  fact	  that	  seems	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  likely),	  then	  men	  who	  acquired	  this	  tendency	  would	  have	  more	  children,	  and	  this	  tendency	  would	   therefore	   spread	   throughout	   society.	   (This	   example	   obviously	   needs	  more	  elaboration.	   However,	   it	   is	   included	   here	   only	   as	   a	   means	   of	   illustrating	   the	  conceptual	  points	  being	  made.)	  	  Determining	  whether	  genetic	  or	  cultural	   selection	   (or	  some	  combination	  of	   these)	  contributed	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   psychological	   adaptation	   requires	   a	   careful	  specification	  of	   a	  proposed	  natural	  history	  of	   the	   feature—a	  point	   that	  Buss	   et	   al.	  (1998)	   appropriately	   made	   the	   focus	   of	   their	   article.	   This	   point	   is	   even	   more	  important	  given	   the	  position	   I	  advocate.	  The	  steps	   the	   feature	  has	  passed	   through	  and	   the	   functions	   served	  at	   each	  of	   those	   stages	   should	  be	  described.	  The	  natural	  history	   should	   include	   a	   consideration	   of	   what	   means	   of	   transmission	   and	   what	  ontogenetic	  factors	  have	  affected	  and	  continue	  to	  affect	  its	  development.	  	  This	   natural	   history	   will	   generate	   evolutionary	   hypotheses,	   and	   “all	   evolutionary	  hypotheses	   .	   .	   .	   should	   be	   formulated	   in	   a	   precise	   enough	   manner	   to	   produce	  empirical	   predictions	   that	   can	   then	   be	   subjected	   to	   testing	   and	   potential	  falsification”	   (	   Buss	   et	   al.,	   1998,	   pp.	   544–545).	   If	   one	  wants	   to	   comment	   on	  what	  means	   of	   selection	   led	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   adaptation,	   then	   these	   hypotheses	  should	   include	   predictions	   that	   would	   differ	   depending	   on	   whether	   there	   was	  genetic	   or	   cultural	   selection	   (	   Scher,	   1997).	   If	   research	   confirms	   hypotheses	   that	  uniquely	   depend	   on	   there	   being	   “genes	   for”	   a	   particular	   feature,	   then	   the	   genetic	  nature	  of	  the	  feature	  would	  be	  supported.	  If	  such	  differential	  hypotheses	  cannot	  be	  generated,	  then	  one	  cannot	  address	  which	  method	  of	  selection	  was	  involved.	  	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   one	   cannot	   fruitfully	   continue	   to	   study	   the	   adaptation	  without	   determining	   which	   means	   of	   selection	   was	   involved.	   A	   theory	   will	   be	  valuable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  more	  hypotheses	  and	  the	  collection	  of	  further	  data.	   Buss	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   cited	   a	   variety	   of	   studies	   that	   have	   been	   generated	   by	  adaptationist	   thinking,	   attesting	   to	   the	   strength	   of	   evolutionary	   psychology	   as	   a	  paradigm.	  However,	   few	  of	  these	  studies	  had	  anything	  to	  say	  about	  the	  genetics	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  studied,	  let	  alone	  compared	  genetic	  and	  cultural	  selection	  models.	  
	  Buss	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   made	   a	   valuable	   contribution	   to	   thinking	   about	   evolutionary	  psychology.	  However,	  their	  insistence	  that	  adaptations	  are	  by	  necessity	  genetic	  is	  in	  error.	   It	   is	   not	   valuable	   to	   omit	   viable	   mechanisms	   for	   the	   development	   of	  psychological	   features	   from	   study	   by	   definition.	   I	   encourage	   Buss	   et	   al.—and	   all	  psychological	  scientists—to	  be	  even	  more	  “pluralistic	  about	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  of	  evolutionary	  psychology”	  (p.	  545).	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